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ABSTRACT 
The article is devoted to the analysis of European models of water supply and 
wastewater management and their implementation in Ukraine. The authors 
review the classical models of EU water supply and water dsposal 
management: English, French and German, their historical and political 
roots, the theoretical basis. In parallel, the authors analyze the state policy in 
the sphere of water supply and wastewater of Ukraine, the principles of its 
formation and features, the current state of the sphere of water supply and 
wastewater, organizational and legal forms of water supply and wastewater 
enterprises. The article analyzes the current state of realization of public-
private partnership in the field of water supply and wastewater with 
indication of existing contracts and contracts that have become invalid. It is 
proved that the difference between the water supply and wastewater 
companies of different management models in Ukraine is not marked, as the 
general state of the water supply and wastewater sector shows the existence 
of common problems characteristic of all enterprises. In particular, the 
ineffectiveness of tariff policies, depreciation of fixed assets, low quality of 
services, difficult financial condition, inadequate investment, etc. The authors 
discuss the possibilities of adaptation of classical management models in 
Ukraine and possible consequences. The article defines the institutional 
problems of the state policy of Ukraine in the sphere of water supply and 
wastewater, which influence the efficiency of the implementation and 
functioning of any model of management and regulation. 
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Introduction. The state policy of reforming the water supply and wastewater system of 
Ukraine since the 1990s (since independence) was formed under the influence of the models of 
management and regulation of the developed countries of the world. Decentralization, 
demonopolization, development of a competitive environment, improvement of the management 
system, provision of state regulation and control, public-private partnership, etc. [36; 39; 40; 37; 23]. 
At the same time, numerous reforms in the field of water supply and wastewater have not yet solved 
the problems of efficient functioning and development of the water supply and wastewater sector. The 
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systematic lack of investment, inefficient tariff regulation, poor quality of water supply and 
wastewater services lead to a disadvantage in the water supply and wastewater sector. The issue of 
efficient management and regulation of the water supply and wastewater sector, public-private 
partnership, and effective investment mechanisms do not lose their relevance. In this connection, it is 
advisable to analyze the experience of developed European countries in order to identify opportunities 
for the adaptation of European models in Ukrainian conditions. 
Purpose of the study. The purpose of the paper is to analyze the possibility of adaptation of 
European models of water supply and wastewater management in Ukraine, to determine the correlation of 
institutions with the conditions of operation of an optimal management model for Ukraine. 
Research results. National and regional water supply and wastewater systems of the EU 
countries were formed taking into account specific climatic, demographic and topographical situations 
and are the result of a certain cultural, political and social structure of the societies in which they are 
used. The classic division of management systems for water supply and wastewater companies is 
divided into three leading models of the countries of England and Wales, France and Germany. 
The English (Anglo-Saxon) model is characterized by the complete privatization of the 
country's water management complex (private management) with thorough state regulation. An 
example of England and Wales is unique in that no other country in the world, apart from Chile and 
some cities in the United States, has privatized its entire water complex. The competitive segment is 
implemented for the production and distribution of water supply and wastewater services, while water 
supply networks (as monopoly segments) remain under the strict control of an independent state 
regulator - the Water Services Regulatory Authority (OFWAT) [17; 12]. 
The French model is characterized by contractual mechanisms of public-private partnership 
and market regulation, which involves the transfer of local authorities to the management of private 
companies communal property or powers. The French model comes from the old tradition of public-
private partnership. The contract for the first delegation in the French water supply system dates back 
to 1856. The basic principles of this model are partnership, self-sustainability and organizational 
flexibility. They come from two legal constructions: legal acts regulating local communal services 
(normative activity of the state), and contract law, agreements regulating the relations between the 
responsible authority and the enterprise-executing services (legal practice and traditions). The classic 
type of public-private partnership contract is the "at your own risk" concession. Under such an 
agreement, the concessionaire entrusts the management concessionaire and the provision of the 
operation of the communal service at its own expense and at its own risk, in return for the provision of 
various rights and privileges, in particular the right to collect payments from consumers. Another type 
of contractual relationship is the lease of an enterprise, where only the renewal of fixed assets of 
enterprises is carried out. The third type of contracts is a management agreement with payment by 
results, when the operator is not entitled to collect payments from consumers, and receives funds from 
the local budget. Three possible models for the participation of private enterprises in the management 
of the water supply and wastewater sector are selected depending on the degree of subordination to the 
laws of the market: completely, partially or very limited [28, p. 23-26]. Approximately 21% of the 
population of France receives water from municipal producers, while 79% are served by one of the 
three largest French water operators: Veolia, Suez-Lyonnaise des Eaux and SAUR [1]. 
The German model is characterized by a high degree of participation of local authorities in the 
management of water supply and wastewater services. Municipalities create joint ventures with water 
supply and wastewater companies in the form of open joint-stock companies. In this case, the 
infrastructure of water supply is included in the authorized capital of open joint stock companies as a 
contribution of the municipality, which allows controlling the majority of shares. Among the many 
factors that can explain the choice of this model, the very nature of the German political institutions is 
leading. Germany is a federal state. As each of the 16 federal states has its own specific laws, the 
water sector is extremely fragmented, with thousands of small, local operators and many different 
ways of organizing. Consequently, in the national market, unlike the French or British model, there are 
no dominant large operators. About 30% of the population in Germany receives water supply from 
private operators, which is only about 9% of the total number of operating entities. For the most part, 
private operators are active in large cities and in the eastern part of Germany [1; 13; 26; 27]. 
Sufficiently empirical research is devoted to the analysis of water supply management and 
wastewater management models and analysis of the functioning of alternative municipal model 
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management. Part of these studies is devoted to the general question of the impact of the form of 
ownership of water supply and sewerage objects on the efficiency of the sphere's operation, while the 
other part studies the relationship between management models and tariffs for water supply and 
wastewater services, the other part - the link between the form of ownership and quality of services, 
the other part - the connection between the form of ownership and the efficiency of water use [10; 9; 
14; 16; 7; 2; 8; 20, p.34]. The conclusions of these studies vary, but they all converge in one: the 
ownership itself does not affect the efficiency of the activities of water supply and wastewater 
companies. The question is whether the water supply and wastewater company will have enough 
opportunities and criteria (let's call them "institutions") for effective service delivery. 
Empirical studies on the relationship between the form of ownership of the water supply and 
wastewater company, the model of management and the size of tariffs for water and wastewater 
services proved that privatization or increase of the share of private property sometimes leads to 
unreasonable growth of tariffs for services [4; 3; 5; 6; 11; 15]. The main conclusion of such studies is 
that the private sector's participation in the water supply and wastewater sector leads to an increase in 
tariffs for water supply and wastewater services. 
On the other hand, UN reports on human development indicate that the conditions for the 
reform of communal services for each country may be different, but those utilities that operate within 
the framework of such a state policy that meets the basic requirements: independence and financial 
autonomy, which are Do not allow political interference with resources; Democracy and transparency 
of policies to ensure accountability; the separation of water supply and wastewater services from 
administrative services that oversee the management and define well-defined standards for water 
supply and wastewater services; adequate state funding to expand the water supply and wastewater 
system, along with the implementation of a national water supply strategy for all citizens [21]. 
The state policy in the sphere of water supply and wastewater of Ukraine over the past 10 
years has been formed in the direction of creating the proper conditions for the development of public-
private partnership and the introduction of state regulation in the field. The modern sphere of 
centralized water supply and wastewater of Ukraine is serviced by 2716 water supply and wastewater 
enterprises mainly of communal property (except in isolated cases where the ownership form is state, 
private or mixed), decentralized water supply and wastewater - enterprises of various ownership forms 
[30]. In addition, facilities for engineering infrastructure and urban amenities, including networks, 
facilities, equipment that are connected with the supply of water, gas, heat, as well as wastewater and 
sanitation treatment, can not be privatized [38]. 
The predominant form of management of enterprises of water supply and wastewater in Ukraine is 
direct communal management. The only enterprise of water supply and wastewater in Ukraine with a 
delegated municipal form of management, which according to some criteria corresponds to the German 
management model − private joint-stock company PRAT "AK Kyivvodokanal" privatized in 1999 
according to the local program under the influence of the world tendency of privatization of the water 
sector 1990s AKV "Kyivvodokanal" holds 67% of the shares of the company belonging to the Private Joint 
Stock Company "Kyivenergoholding", 25% of shares - the municipal property department of Kyiv, the 
executive body of the Kyiv City Council (Kyiv city state administration), the remaining shares - to the 
shareholders of the members of the labor collective of the enterprise [25]. The company serves the capital 
of Ukraine with an actual number of 4 million people. 
Directions of reformation of the water supply and wastewater economy of Ukraine in the late 
1990s indicate that the French model of governance was considered as the most effective model for 
Ukraine, which allows the private sector to be involved in the communal economy while controlling 
the production of services for water supply and wastewater through the ownership of the 
infrastructure. However, the contractual mechanisms of public-private partnership in the sphere of 
water supply and wastewater of Ukraine are developing at a pace that was not expected at the time 
when the state policy was formed. Table 1 shows the lease / concession contracts of the water supply 
and sewerage industry in Ukraine, and Table 2 deals that were terminated for various reasons.  
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Table 1. Current lease / concession agreements of water supply and wastewater companies 
(made on the basis of [29; 31; 32; 33; 41]). 
City/town, 
population 
Agreement description Lease/concession 
term 
Odesa  
Population - 
1 013 292 
people (as of 
01.01.2019) 
The integral property complex of communal enterprise 
Odesvodokanal was transferred from 01.01.2004 to LLC 
"Infox Ltd." (branch "Infoxvodokanal"). At the time of the 
lease, the state of constructions and equipment of the enterprise 
was close to the critical one: the depreciation of fixed assets 
amounted to 55%, water losses in water supply networks – 
42%, arrears for the used electric power – 25 mln. 
49 years 
Severodonetsk 
Population – 
104 503 people 
(2018) 
The integral property complex of the communal enterprise 
"Severodonetskvodokanal" in 2009 was transferred to the 
concession LLC "Town service" 
25 years 
Bila Tserkva  
Population –  
209 176 people 
(2018) 
 
The integral property complex of the utility company 
"Bilotserkivvodokanal" in 2012 was transferred to the 
concession LLC "Belotserkivvoda". According to the 
concession contract, not all property complex was transferred 
to the concession, but only those objects connected with water 
supply and wastewater. The remaining property will continue 
to be serviced and maintained by the utility company 
"Belotserkvvodokanalom". 
15 years 
 
Table 2. Lease / Concession Agreements for Water Supply and Wastewater Companies, which 
were terminated for various reasons (drawn up on the basis of [34; 35; 19]) 
Agreement Description of the agreement and the grounds for its termination  
Lease of utility 
company 
"KirovogradVodokanal" 
(2006 - 2008) 
The integral property complex of the KirovogradVodokanal Utility Company 
was transferred to the Water Management Company in 2006 for lease for 49 
years. The lease lasted 2 years, and in 2008 the Supreme Economic Court of 
Ukraine issued a resolution to terminate the lease agreement of the integral 
property complex KP "Kirovogudvodokanal" No. 42/17, concluded on March 
23, 2007 between "Water Enterprise" Ltd. and the Property Management and 
Privatization of Communal Property of Kirovohrad City Council due to 
violation of the terms of the lease agreement. 
Concession RME 
"Luhanskvoda" (2006-
2012) 
The integral property complex of the oblast utility company "Company" 
Luganskvoda "was transferred to the concession in 2006 by Luhansk 
Regional Council LLC "Luganskvoda "(the founder of which was the 
company" Rosvodokanal ") for a period of 25 years. 
RME "Luganskvoda" serviced 26 cities, 66 settlements and 81 villages, in 
which 1.6 million citizens lived and operated about 6 thousand enterprises. 
The concession agreement identified investment by the concessionaire in 
the amount of 756.7 million UAH and provided for the implementation of 
measures aimed at improving the water accounting system, updating the 
fleet of vehicles, reducing energy consumption and reducing excessive 
water losses. However, in 2012, the concession contract was terminated, the 
concessionaire's debt amounted to 90 million UAH 
Concession of the State 
Communal Enterprise 
"Berdyansky City 
Water Distribution 
Channel" (2008-2011) 
The integral property complex of the state utility company "Berdyansky 
City Water Supply" was transferred to the management under the contract 
of concession №1 dated December 11, 2008 LLC "Chista Voda-
Berdyansk". However, in 2009, the Berdyansk City Council adopted a 
decision dated 29.10.2009 No. 2 "On Early Termination of a Concession 
Contract and Determination of the Contractor for Services for Water 
Supply and Wastewater Treatment in Berdyansk". Trial delays lasted until 
2011. And the decision of the Supreme Economic Court of Ukraine was 
decided to terminate the concession agreement between the Berdyansk City 
Council and LLC "Clean Water - Berdyansk". 
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It should be noted that there is no significant difference between water supply and wastewater 
enterprises of different management models in Ukraine, since the general state of the water supply and 
wastewater sector shows the existence of common problems characteristic of all enterprises. In particular, 
the ineffectiveness of tariff policies, depreciation of fixed assets, poor quality of services, difficult financial 
condition, inadequate volume of investments, etc. [30]. Table 3 shows the level of tariffs for centralized 
water supply services for sample enterprises of different forms of management, which shows the lack of a 
relationship between the form of ownership / form of management and tariff [42]. 
 
 
Two models of the countries of the world with market economy were taken into account when 
forming the model of state regulation of the water supply and wastewater system of Ukraine: the first, 
where regulatory functions were relied upon by a specially created regulatory authority (used in 
England, the Baltic States and South America: Argentina, Venezuela, Peru, Chile); the second when 
regulatory functions are assigned to the central executive authority and executive bodies of local self-
government or specially created regional, local regulatory authorities (applicable in EU, CIS, Middle 
East) [18, p. 12-13]. By 2011, state regulation in the field of water supply and wastewater was based 
on the model of the second model, but with a national peculiarity. In particular, the state policy of 
regulation of activities of natural monopoly entities in the sphere of housing and communal services 
was implemented by the following authorized bodies of state power: the Antimonopoly Committee of 
Ukraine, the State Committee of Ukraine for Housing and Communal Services, the State Inspection 
for Price Control, the Council of Ministers of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea , local state 
administrations, executive bodies of village, settlement, city councils. The existing system of state 
regulation was not effective, since the powers of the regulatory bodies were not clearly demarcated, 
duplication of regulatory and supervisory functions of the authorities, coordination between the 
controlling bodies, etc., the mechanisms of state regulation, mainly focused on the regulation of 
pricing. Water supply and wastewater companies showed negative financial results, the quality of 
services deteriorated, as well as the deteriorating state of the industry as a whole, tariff policy was the 
subject of political speculation. Has not shown efficiency and tariff regulation of local self-
government bodies. As a result of the reform of the water supply and wastewater sector, from 2011, 
state regulation of 74% of the water supply and wastewater market is carried out by an independent 
state regulatory body (NEURC), while the rest of the market is regulated by local authorities [24].  
Conclusions. Taking into account the above, let's try to answer the question whether Ukraine's 
adaptation of classical water management and regulation models in the field of water supply and 
wastewater is possible. In particular, full privatization of the water management complex of Ukraine 
with thorough state regulation (like the English model, the state regulator is considered the best in the 
world). In our opinion, the introduction of such a model in its pure form in Ukrainian realities is 
impossible and will not have the same effect as at one time in England. The mechanisms of state 
regulation of the English model were developed on the basis of the theory of optimum, in a truly 
liberal tradition, and the theory of imperfect markets in the conditions of a monopoly. These theories 
were enriched with the experience of developed capitalism, in which to achieve the optimal result is 
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(excluding VAT)
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possible: the maximum introduction of competition, the development of clear short-term contracts, the 
formation of controlling bodies [28, p. 38-39]. The peculiarities of the Ukrainian basis for the 
formation of management models are laid down in the institutions of the state policy of Ukraine in the 
field of water supply and wastewater, which prove: 1) the deformation of the institute of property in 
the state and the problem of the formation of an effective owner in the communal sphere; 2) low-
quality legal support for the functioning of the water supply and wastewater sector; 
3) underdevelopment of the judicial system and its ineffectiveness (deformation of the rule of law 
principle); 4) ineffective financial and economic policy of the state; 5) ineffective administrative 
reform of the state, lack of succession in the state apparatus; 6) the formation of a distorted public 
ideology; 7) institutional failure of the authorities; 8) low level of social culture; 9) low activity or lack 
of public opinion, which enhances the role of the state in the field of water supply and wastewater; 
10) politicization of tariff formation procedures and procedures; 11) orientation of the state policy to 
address the interests of influential business structures. It is easy to predict that the introduction of such 
a model in Ukraine will end with a simple substitution of the state monopoly for a private monopoly, 
with the invariability of the problems of the sphere, orientation of measures for the quick profit of 
business structures, rather than long-term modernization of the sphere. 
It should be noted that the mentioned institutional problems of the water supply and 
wastewater system will remain characteristic for the sphere irrespective of changes in management and 
regulation models, as they are the basic problems of the state policy. The implementation of the 
German model of water supply and wastewater management (which has been considered the best 
governance model for the last 10 years) requires a strong position of local governments, which is 
typical of countries with a federal structure and relevant historical and cultural traditions and legal 
regulation (including the legal culture ) Germany built its strong municipal system from the end of the 
19th century. and adheres to it so far. Decentralization of local authorities reduces state influence on 
the sphere and is inseparable from the responsibility of local authorities for efficient management of 
communal property, for ensuring sustainable and safe water supply and wastewater. The effectiveness 
of decentralization depends on the local social and political context and state policy of the country, 
especially the existing institutions and the quality of governance [22]. The ten-year experience of tariff 
regulation of local governments in the field of water supply and wastewater in Ukraine showed the use 
of regulatory functions to meet their own political interests of local self-government bodies. And the 
implementation of the decentralization reform in Ukraine has not yet yielded adequate results. So, to 
speak today about the possibility of introduction in Ukraine of a model of corporate governance with 
regulatory functions of local self-government is too early. Perhaps, after some years of implementing 
the decentralization of power reform, local authorities will take an active and strong position in the 
water supply and wastewater sector, which will change the existing state policy. 
The introduction of a more flexible French model of governance, under which some normative and 
legal acts on public-private partnership and concessionality features developed in Ukraine, are complicated 
(with the exception of the institutional problems of state policy), the lack of experienced national water 
supply management and wastewater management companies, minor legal practice and the lack of traditions 
of contractual (contractual) law, the weak position of local self-government bodies regarding effective 
management of communal services property and services of water supply and wastewater. The principles 
of operation and construction of the French management model derive from the thinking system, which is 
based on the analysis of various forms of state regulation of the economy and the consolidation of the legal 
norms of communal services, in which the state, involving private enterprises, is interested in the fact that 
works and services have been fulfilled, qualitatively [28, p. 39]. 
Thus, the question of the need for adaptation of European models of water supply and wastewater 
management and regulation in Ukraine should not be considered in the context of the connection of the 
private sector with the efficiency of the operation of the water supply and wastewater system, and in the 
context of a clear understanding of the purpose of the introduction of such management and regulation − 
meeting needs consumers in obtaining quality water supply and wastewater services. In our opinion, the 
current state policy of Ukraine in the field of water supply and wastewater should be based on that 
experience and those basic principles that are clearly understood in decades of building a market economy. 
This means that the fundamental change of ownership in the sphere of water supply and wastewater 
without changing the principles and resolving the institutional problems of state policy will not lead to 
effective changes, but it can worsen the existing state of affairs. Therefore, management models should be 
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based on the principle of unchanging communal ownership of water supply and wastewater enterprises 
(apart from new water supply and wastewater systems that can be built with the help of private investors) 
with the introduction and development of the legal culture of contract law. Accordingly, the model of 
regulation in the field of water supply and wastewater can be reviewed depending on the strengthening or 
weakening of the position of local governments and the state. 
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